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	<title>Comentários em: The chief-economist the central bankers do not listened to</title>
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		<title>Por: Ensaios sobre a crise III: Esta Recessão foi diferente</title>
		<link>http://janelanaweb.com/novidades/the-chief-economist-the-central-bankers-do-not-listened-to/comment-page-1/#comment-588</link>
		<dc:creator>Ensaios sobre a crise III: Esta Recessão foi diferente</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 24 May 2010 11:28:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://janelanaweb.com/?p=187#comment-588</guid>
		<description>[...] canadiano Willian White, que foi conselheiro económico do Bank for International Settlements (BIS, que é precisamente uma [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] canadiano Willian White, que foi conselheiro económico do Bank for International Settlements (BIS, que é precisamente uma [...]</p>
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		<title>Por: A New Synthesis for macroeconomics</title>
		<link>http://janelanaweb.com/novidades/the-chief-economist-the-central-bankers-do-not-listened-to/comment-page-1/#comment-479</link>
		<dc:creator>A New Synthesis for macroeconomics</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Dec 2009 12:59:08 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>[...] like Friedrich von Hayek and Ludwig von Mises) is one of the fields of economic research of Dr. William White, the economist the central bankers do not listened to during the bubble of the [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] like Friedrich von Hayek and Ludwig von Mises) is one of the fields of economic research of Dr. William White, the economist the central bankers do not listened to during the bubble of the [...]</p>
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		<title>Por: Ascensão e Coma do “liberalismo” – hipótese de investigação</title>
		<link>http://janelanaweb.com/novidades/the-chief-economist-the-central-bankers-do-not-listened-to/comment-page-1/#comment-430</link>
		<dc:creator>Ascensão e Coma do “liberalismo” – hipótese de investigação</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2009 11:35:47 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>[...] mso-paper-source:0;} div.Section1 {page:Section1;} &#8211;&gt; Desde há muito que William White, ex-quadro do BIS, reclamava a necessidade de um rejeição da prociclicidade em tempos de alta [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] mso-paper-source:0;} div.Section1 {page:Section1;} &#8211;&gt; Desde há muito que William White, ex-quadro do BIS, reclamava a necessidade de um rejeição da prociclicidade em tempos de alta [...]</p>
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		<title>Por: Shalom P. Hamou</title>
		<link>http://janelanaweb.com/novidades/the-chief-economist-the-central-bankers-do-not-listened-to/comment-page-1/#comment-309</link>
		<dc:creator>Shalom P. Hamou</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2009 00:06:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://janelanaweb.com/?p=187#comment-309</guid>
		<description>The article: &lt;a href=&quot;http://blog.yield-curve.net/2009/07/systemic-bernanke.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Ben &quot;Systemic Risk&quot; Bernanke&lt;/a&gt; proves that Bernanke knowingly maintained a strict monetary policy long after he knew of the sub prime problem as he knew it would cause of the &quot;Depression&quot;.

It shows that he probably engineered it on purpose!

&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;If you want to sleep tonight, Don&#039;t Read It!&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/i&gt;

&lt;i&gt;&quot;In contradiction to the prevalent view of the time, that money and monetary policy played at most a purely passive role in the Depression, Friedman and Schwartz argued that &lt;b&gt;&quot;the [economic] contraction is in fact a tragic testimonial to the importance of monetary forces&quot;&lt;/b&gt; (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, p. 300).
.....


The slowdown in economic activity, together with high interest rates, was in all likelihood the most important source of the stock market crash that followed in October.

In other words, the market crash, rather than being the cause of the Depression, as popular legend has it, was in fact largely the result of an economic slowdown and &lt;b&gt;the inappropriate monetary policies that preceded it.&lt;/b&gt;

Of course, the stock market crash only worsened the economic situation, hurting consumer and business confidence and contributing to a still deeper downturn in 1930.&quot;&lt;/i&gt;

Governor Ben S. Bernanke
&lt;b&gt;Money, Gold, and the Great Depression.&lt;/b&gt;
At the H. Parker Willis Lecture in Economic Policy, Washington and Lee University,
Lexington, Virginia.
March 2nd, 2004


You can read also: &lt;a href=&quot;http://blog.yield-curve.net/2009/07/27.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Preparing for the  Crash, The Age of Turbulence Update: 22/07/09.&lt;/a&gt;, which tries to accomplish Greenspan Mission Impossible:


That is &lt;b&gt;mission impossible&lt;/b&gt;. Indeed, the international financial community has made numerous efforts in recent years to establish such oversight, but none prevented or ameliorated the crisis that began last summer. Much as we might wish otherwise, policy makers cannot reliably anticipate financial or economic shocks or the consequences of economic imbalances. Financial crises are characterised by discontinuous breaks in market pricing the timing of which by definition must be unanticipated - if people see them coming, then the markets arbitrage them away.&quot;&lt;/i&gt;

Alan Greenspan
&lt;b&gt;The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World [Economic Order?].&lt;/b&gt;


&lt;a href=&quot;http://blog.yield-curve.net/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Plea for a New World Economic Order.&lt;/a&gt; explains the nature and causes of economic depressions and proposes a plausible alternative solution.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The article: <a href="http://blog.yield-curve.net/2009/07/systemic-bernanke.html" rel="nofollow">Ben &#8220;Systemic Risk&#8221; Bernanke</a> proves that Bernanke knowingly maintained a strict monetary policy long after he knew of the sub prime problem as he knew it would cause of the &#8220;Depression&#8221;.</p>
<p>It shows that he probably engineered it on purpose!</p>
<p><b><i>If you want to sleep tonight, Don&#8217;t Read It!</i></b></p>
<p><i>&#8220;In contradiction to the prevalent view of the time, that money and monetary policy played at most a purely passive role in the Depression, Friedman and Schwartz argued that <b>&#8220;the [economic] contraction is in fact a tragic testimonial to the importance of monetary forces&#8221;</b> (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, p. 300).<br />
&#8230;..</p>
<p>The slowdown in economic activity, together with high interest rates, was in all likelihood the most important source of the stock market crash that followed in October.</p>
<p>In other words, the market crash, rather than being the cause of the Depression, as popular legend has it, was in fact largely the result of an economic slowdown and <b>the inappropriate monetary policies that preceded it.</b></p>
<p>Of course, the stock market crash only worsened the economic situation, hurting consumer and business confidence and contributing to a still deeper downturn in 1930.&#8221;</i></p>
<p>Governor Ben S. Bernanke<br />
<b>Money, Gold, and the Great Depression.</b><br />
At the H. Parker Willis Lecture in Economic Policy, Washington and Lee University,<br />
Lexington, Virginia.<br />
March 2nd, 2004</p>
<p>You can read also: <a href="http://blog.yield-curve.net/2009/07/27.html" rel="nofollow">Preparing for the  Crash, The Age of Turbulence Update: 22/07/09.</a>, which tries to accomplish Greenspan Mission Impossible:</p>
<p>That is <b>mission impossible</b>. Indeed, the international financial community has made numerous efforts in recent years to establish such oversight, but none prevented or ameliorated the crisis that began last summer. Much as we might wish otherwise, policy makers cannot reliably anticipate financial or economic shocks or the consequences of economic imbalances. Financial crises are characterised by discontinuous breaks in market pricing the timing of which by definition must be unanticipated &#8211; if people see them coming, then the markets arbitrage them away.&#8221;</p>
<p>Alan Greenspan<br />
<b>The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World [Economic Order?].</b></p>
<p><a href="http://blog.yield-curve.net/" rel="nofollow">Plea for a New World Economic Order.</a> explains the nature and causes of economic depressions and proposes a plausible alternative solution.</p>
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